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Abstract
The November 2014 Australian State of Victoria elec-
tion was the first statutory political election world-
wide at State level which deployed an end-to-end ver-
ifiable electronic voting system in polling places. This
was the first time blind voters have been able to cast
a fully secret ballot in a verifiable way, and the first
time a verifiable voting system has been used to col-
lect remote votes in a political election. The code is
open source, and the output from the election is ver-
ifiable. The system took 1121 votes from these par-
ticular groups, an increase on 2010 and with fewer
polling places.
1 Introduction
Proposals for verifiable electronic voting that provide
assurances for secrecy of the ballot and integrity of
the election have been in the academic literature since
the early 2000’s [1, 2, 3, 4, 5], but the challenge of
making them usable and practical for ordinary voters
and integrating them into well-understood election
processes has meant that their practical deployment
has been slow in coming.
The State of Victoria has a proud history of innova-
tion in voting systems, having introduced the secret
ballot and deployed the world’s first secret ballot elec-
tion in 1856 [6] with government printed ballots and
controlled polling place supervision. More recently,
the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) was an
early adopter of electronic voting, and fielded sys-
tems in 2006 and 2010. The primary driver for elec-
tronic voting in Victoria is to provide better accessi-
bility for blind, partially sighted, and motor impaired
voters through customised interfaces, and to provide
access to voters in languages other than English. It
also provided the opportunity for voters to vote elec-
tronically out of state and internationally, enabling
more rapid return of the votes into the tallying pro-
cess. In Australian elections attendance is compul-
sory, and this also demands that all efforts must be
made by the Election Authorities to enable people to
vote. Consideration of security and transparency is-
sues on this high-consequence system motivated them
towards a supervised verifiable voting solution to be
offered in polling places. Australia has no e-voting
standards or guidelines (except the Telephone Voting
Standards TVS2.0), so the Victorian Electoral Com-
mission were guided by the Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines [7] as these were considered to be the most
recent, progressive, and considered networked IT se-
curity threats. In particular the system was designed
to provide software independence [8]: that “an unde-
tected change or error in the software cannot cause
an undetectable change or error in the election out-
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Figure 1: Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly Ballot forms
come”.
The election system in Victoria poses particular
challenges for any verifiable solution, because of the
complexity of the ballot. Voters vote in two races
in State Elections, using ballot forms illustrated in
Figure 1. For the Legislative Council voters are of-
fered a list of around 40 candidates to rank in their
preferred order, listed Below The Line (BTL). They
may instead select a preference order provided by a
party by selecting one choice Above The Line (ATL).
For the Legislative Assembly voters rank all of the
candidates in preferential order.
There are 8 regions comprising 88 districts, so there
are 96 races in total. Nominations for candidates
were open until Noon on Friday 14th November 2014,
and the electronic system needed to be ready to take
votes from Monday 17th November. There is a period
of two weeks of “early voting” for which the electronic
system is deployed, leading up to the official election
day on Saturday 29th November. Electronic voting
was only available during early voting. Voters are
allowed to use any polling station anywhere to cast
a ballot in their home race. Thus all polling stations
must offer ballot forms for all the races across the
State. This is also a requirement for the electronic
system.
The total number of registered voters for the 2014
election was 3.8 million, of whom 2014 Australian
Bureau of Statistics [9] indicate as many as 186,000
Victorian travellers, 100,000 adults not proficient in
English and 118,000 adults with low vision or blind-
ness1 were eligible to vote using the electronic system.
Note also that in 2009 7.8% of 3.8m (8.6% minus Di-
abetics as main low vision cohort) needed help with
reading or writing, making a further 296,000 addi-
tional to the numbers above.
A total of 1121 votes were collected. This was more
votes than were collected by the 2010 electronic sys-
tem, and the system was deployed at fewer locations.
2 Related work
The only end-to-end verifiable political elections to
date have taken place in Takoma Park, Maryland,
US, where the Scantegrity system was successfully
used in 2009 and 2011 in the municipal election for
mayor and city council members [10]. This ground-
breaking work demonstrated the feasibility of run-
ning an election in a verifiable way. However, the
Scantegrity system becomes impractical with a pref-
erential ballot with 40 candidates, and would require
non-trivial changes to its design to handle a state-
wide election.
Other verifiable systems such as Helios [11] and
Wombat [12] have been used for Student Union and
other non-political elections, but scaling them up to
politically binding elections and hardening them for a
1Blind Citizens Australia, Australian Blind and Vision Im-
paired Statistics
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more robust environment is challenging, and in their
present form they are also not so suitable for elections
as complex as those in Victoria. Other electronic elec-
tions that have been fielded (such as those recently
fielded in Estonia, Norway, Canada, and New South
Wales) do not provide end-to-end verifiability. Some
of them allow voters to verify some aspect of their
vote (for example, that the system has a vote with a
particular receipt number) but do not provide verifi-
ability all the way from the vote cast through to the
final tally.
3 System Description
The starting point for the design of the system was
the Preˆt a` Voter split ballot [3], a printed ballot
form with the candidates listed in a randomised or-
der (different on different ballot forms), where the
voter makes their selection and then separates and
destroys the list of candidates, retaining and casting
the marked preference list for verifiable tallying. Nu-
merous additional design steps were required to make
this system practical in the context of the Victorian
election, and the development of the design lasted
over a period of about two years. The completed
design is described in [13]. The first critical devel-
opment was to adapt the design to incorporate elec-
tronic assistance to capture the vote (necessary for
such a large number of candidates), so an Electronic
Ballot Marker was introduced: a tablet that provided
a voter interface for capturing the vote. The design
was also adapted to handle preferential voting; the
ballot forms needed to be printed on demand in the
polling places since voters can vote in any race for
which they are registered; a secure and robust dis-
tributed web bulletin board needed to be designed
and implemented for accepting the votes and verifi-
ably making the information public; and some tech-
nical solutions were required for compressing votes
for processing them, to cope with the large number
of candidates.
End-to-end verifiability
The end-to-end verifiability provided by the system
relies on a number of checks, including some which
must be performed by some of the voters. Once a
voter is validated as being eligible to vote, they are
provided with a candidate list (CL) with the names
in a random order.
Voters choose either to use this list to cast their
vote, or to have it audited. Voters are allowed to de-
mand that the list they are given is ‘audited’ to check
that the printed order matches the encrypted order
that the system has already committed to. An au-
dited CL is decrypted and so cannot then be used to
vote, since it would expose the vote. Following audit
a voter would need to be issued with a new CL. In
practice, for this initial deployment voters were not
alerted to this possibility since there was a concern
that the subtlety of what it was achieving (essentially
random sampling of correct construction of the ballot
forms) was too complex for voters to absorb on the
spot. For future deployments some advance educa-
tion would raise awareness of this step.
If the voter instead uses the list to vote, then it
is scanned into the tablet. The booth setup is illus-
trated in Figure 2, and the setup for blind voters is
illustrated in Figure 3. Scanning of the candidate
list QR code launches the vote capture application,
which allows the voter to enter their vote via the tele-
phone keypad overlay. The regular tablet interface
for sighted voters is illustrated in Figure 4. Having
voted, a preferences receipt (PR) with the preferences
in the same order is printed separately. The voter
verifies that the preferences match the correct candi-
dates, by comparing the lists side by side, as in Fig-
ure 5. This check ensures that the receipt captures
the vote as cast. Once this is done the candidate list
must be destroyed in order to keep the vote secret.
The PR is retained by the voter. The fact that the
candidate names were in a random order ensures that
the PR does not expose who the preferences were for
and thus provides ballot secrecy.
The system allows voters to ‘quarantine’ or cancel
their vote if the PR is not provided for any reason, or
if the voter considers it to be incorrect, and in such
cases the voter may cast their vote again.
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Figure 2: A voting booth
Figure 3: A voting booth for use by blind voters.
Note the tactile ‘telephone keypad’ overlay over the
touchscreen, and the headphones for audio instruc-
tions
Figure 4: Tablet interface for capturing votes
Figure 5: Matching the candidate list and preference
receipt
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The voter later looks up their PR on the Web Bul-
letin Board, and verifies that it has been included
properly.
It is important to add that all aspects of the vot-
ing interfaces as well as the verification measures in-
tended for electors were also made accessible. A bal-
lot audit could be taken to an EBM and the device
would read the contents out. Both the CL and PR
could be read out separately on any EBM or if pro-
vided together, the assembled preference-order vote
could be read back to the elector. All EBMs were pro-
vided with headphones and the voting interfaces pro-
vided three completely separate forms for those with
some vision; for those who could use touch-screen
gestures; and, for those who wanted a telephone-IVR
type interaction - which was provided via a latex
screen overlay giving the tactile impression of the 12
telephone buttons.
The system deployment also made use of conven-
tional security features of course, such as how it was
remote managed, logging, and so on.
End-to-end verifiability is achieved through the col-
lection of all the steps above. Voters can check that
their vote is cast as intended, since they check the
list of candidates against the preference list on their
receipt. They confirm their vote is recorded as cast
by checking that their preferences on the receipt cor-
respond to the information recorded on the bulletin
board. Finally, it is publicly verifiable that the cor-
rect tally is returned, counted as recorded, because the
mixing and decrypting of the encrypted votes gener-
ates cryptographic proofs that can be independently
checked. This provides a chain of links all the way
from the initial creation of blank ballots to casting of
the vote right through to the tallying.
In this election the electronic votes needed to be
combined with paper votes, and so the electronic
votes were printed off to be included within the count
of the paper votes. Printed vote also bore a file line
number which could be used to check any printed
e-vote with the emitted verifiable clear text votes on-
line. In this case we have verifiability through to the
decrypted votes: that any cast vote did make it into
the paper count, which was then done in the usual
way.
The front-end user interface and election adminis-
tration was developed in-house by VEC. VEC con-
tracted the University of Surrey to develop the back
end, SuVote [14], which was responsible for creating
ballot forms, accepting the votes and managing the
web bulletin board. VEC contracted Cryptowork-
shop.com to develop the Mixnet, Ximix [15]. The
project also involved a wider academic advisory team
from the Universities of Surrey, Melbourne and Lux-
embourg. The independent review of the design and
code [16] was conducted by Demtech.
4 Deployment
Because this was a completely novel system, VEC
rolled out in a limited deployment in 24 early vot-
ing centres around Victoria including 6 “accessibil-
ity super centres”, and offered only to the particular
legislated groups of voters. It was also deployed in
the Australia Centre, London, UK where legislation
made it available to all voters who were casting their
vote from there in order to gain experience of the
remote voting solution.
The total number of votes that were received over
the two weeks were 1121, of which 973 were from
London and the remaining 148 from the 24 centres in
the State of Victoria.
In fact the system was developed for much higher
demands in order to scale up for future elections: it
handled 1 million votes in testing, and under stress
was able to respond to individual voters within 10s,
and to accept 800 votes in a 10s period.
5 Outcomes
A range of instruments were used to evaluate this
project. A University of Surrey survey of voters leav-
ing the Australia Centre in London having cast their
votes is most indicative of the system with the entire
voter cohort. For Victoria, VEC ran an anonymous
online questionnaire of the poll workers asked ques-
tions about equipment setup and voter support. Both
surveys asked about verifiability, trust and security.
VEC also ran its own survey of London electors as
well as Victorian electors.
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To analyse time-to-vote, receipt lookup and other
measurements, server logs and web server analytics
were used. Google Analytics collected information
for public-facing information and lookup services. It
should be noted that the voting protocol does not
capture voting interface actions and that the Ballot
Marker is stateless. These privacy controls prevented
more conventional usability data being captured such
as user actions on the ballot faces. Prior to the
live election the system was instead usability tested
by VEC with several cohorts of voters with barriers
and with non-English speaking (non-bilingual) volun-
teers. The system usability was assessed by an expert
third party organisation.
Voter surveys
The London data has a very low (1.6%) non-answer
rate and responses were collected by approaching
electors at random. The survey form is attached in
Appendix A. Some questions were taken from an in-
ternational benchmark[17] to provide a level field for
measuring verifiability effectiveness via electors.
The overall results were that voters were generally
satisfied with the usability of the system, but there
was a wide variation in understanding of the security
assurances provided. For example, some voters an-
swered that the receipt showed their vote (which it
does not, since a receipt should never link directly
to any vote). The results are shown in Figure 6.
Although most voters trusted the system implicitly
they nonetheless took part in the verifiability steps
and many said they would check receipts at home.
The resistance to such new steps reported in [17] was
not observed in London. No voters reported that
the process took“too long” despite the added task of
comparing CL to PR.
In more detail, the headline results from the voter
surveys were as follows:
1. Respondents found the system easy to use, as
illustrated in Figure 7. 75% or greater respon-
dents stated Agree or Strongly Agree to all pos-
itive aspects of usability. 75% stated they pre-
ferred the system to paper voting. This is also
evident in comments and in the time taken to
Figure 6: Responses to the statement: “Someone who
sees your receipt can know your vote”
Figure 7: Responses to the statement: “The system
was easy to use”
vote. 60% of respondents voted in 4 minutes or
under, with 96% in 5-10 minutes or less. This
was the whole time to vote on the system (not
the time to get a PR or wait in queues). None
stated the process took “too long”. 87% stated
Agree or Strongly Agree to the statement “I
would tell other people to use this system,” il-
lustrated in Figure 8.
2. Respondents trusted the voting system, and this
correlated strongly with the user having a good
user experience. Just over 60% of respondents
had no concerns regarding e-voting security.
3. Respondents found the verification lists easy to
use. About half of the respondents compared
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Figure 8: Responses to the statement: “I would tell
other people to use this system”
the CL and PR together. This rate of checks
provides a confidence level of over 99.9% that
votes were not changed on submission to the Bul-
letin Board in sufficient numbers to change the
outcome. The closest race was Prahran with a
winning margin of 41 votes, meaning that a mini-
mum of 21 would need to have been altered (from
the reported runner-up to the reported winner,
in the unlikely event that the reported runner
up in fact won by a single vote) in order to have
changed the outcome in that race.
4. About 40% stated they were Very Likely or
Likely to verify their receipt on the VEC website.
In fact there were around 150 receipt lookups
(the figure of 250 in Table 9 includes just un-
der 100 tests), about 13% of the electronic votes
cast.
5. Many respondents did not understand the pur-
pose of the verification measures. This is evident
in low correlation with questions about trust and
security as well as from comments. More than
half of respondents thought that the voting re-
ceipt gave away the content of their vote, which
is not the case. However, for people “concerned
about e-voting”, comprehension of the receipt
was much better, only a quarter felt the receipt
leaked their vote.
6. One desired outcome of the survey was not ob-
served: that at least some respondents would
use verification measures because they have con-
cerns about e-voting. That is, the survey could
not detect the kind of vigilance that the verifica-
tion relies on via negative correlations between
“trust” and “use of the verification measures”.
Poll worker surveys
The poll worker surveys were conducted after the
end of the election. There is some over-reporting as
may be expected since the survey responses can in-
clude the same events reported separately. About
half the staff who supported e-voting responded. The
summary of findings is:
1. System features for accessibility were well used.
A quarter of respondents set font or contrast
for users, with forty percent setting audio mode.
Twelve percent of respondents reported setting
a non-English language.
2. The system did not require much intervention
in the voting session, and when this occurred,
the intended support tools were used. In fewer
than ten percent of cases, staff had to complete
the e-vote for electors. A quarter of respondents
reported using the switch to visual support fea-
ture to help an audio voter in-session. No re-
spondents needed to use the switch to English
support feature.
3. The verifiability measures were well used. A
quarter of respondents saw electors perform CL-
PR. Only two respondents handled electors re-
porting the PR did not match their vote.
4. Staff may have not fully understood verifiabil-
ity. Three quarters of respondents stated they
Strongly Agree or Agree to understanding ver-
ifiability and the printed lists. However, the
same respondents answered differently to ques-
tions asking them about the lookup of receipts
on the web and of CL audit.
5. Although more than half of respondents stated
the system was Too Difficult to Operate or Not
Very Reliable, two thirds stated they would be
happy to support it if more voters came to use it.
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Two thirds stated they were happy or indifferent
to e-voting.
Web lookups
The vVote suite of pages on vec.vic.gov.au were all
visited with increasing frequency up to Election Day.
Pages such as the Electronic Voting page were hit
more than 20,000 times, by 18,600 unique viewers.
The totals are given in Figure 9.
Users accessed support documents such as loca-
tions of assistive voting centres (950), information
about electronically assisted voting (554), and the
Demtech assessment of vVote (35).
People accessing the vVote suite of pages came
most frequently from LinkedIn (90) and Vision Aus-
tralia (54) and Twitter (24), among others. Google
search outside of VEC was used to access this suite
1071 times with 24 site-internal searches for ‘Elec-
tronic Voting’.
The rate of receipt lookups (13.4%) provides confi-
dence at the 95% level that there have not been suf-
ficient missing, damaged or changed votes to change
the outcome, even in the closest race, Prahran2 . This
means that even if there was cheating in the record-
ing of votes on the bulletin board, then there would
be at least a 95% chance of detecting this. Further-
more, additional voters can check their receipts after
the election, which would make the confidence level
still higher. In fact there were no complaints about
altered or missing votes.
Uptime
1. The Web Bulletin Board systems were up 100%
with no errors. Average response (reply) time
was 0.3 seconds.
2. A full analysis of the log files showed that no un-
expected exceptions occurred during live voting.
3. London was offline intermittently, totalling
about 14 hours of downtime over the two weeks
2If 21 votes were changed (the minimum possible to alter a
result) and each change has a 86.6% probability that it will not
be detected, then the probability that none would be detected
is 0.86621 = 0.049
due to networking problems. Voters affected by
this voted on paper ballots.
Process times
London reported queuing and some network prob-
lems and Victoria served electors with a range of bar-
riers and impairments. We report on London and on
Victoria separately:
London
1. The average time to process a vVote elector was
275.6 seconds—about 4.5 minutes.
2. The average voting session time (excluding print-
ing the candidate list and then waiting to vote)
was 172.2 seconds—about 3 minutes.
3. The shortest process time was 46 seconds, or
which the voting session was 14.6 seconds.
4. The longest process time was 1089.4 seconds
with the voting session taking 100 seconds less.
5. Average time to vote ATL was 152.6 seconds—
about 2.5 minutes.
6. Average time to vote BTL was 270 seconds—
about 4.5 minutes.
Victoria
1. The average time to process a vVote elector was
672.8 seconds—about 11 minutes.
2. The average voting session time (excluding print-
ing the candidate list and then waiting to vote)
was 570.4 seconds—about 9.5 minutes.
3. The shortest process time was 40.9 seconds. The
min voting session was 19.8 seconds.
4. The longest process time was 3895.8 seconds
(just over an hour) with the voting session 300
seconds less.
5. Average time to vote ATL was 542.8 seconds—
about 9 minutes.
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Section/page Sub-page Go Live Views Reading Time
Assistance for voters 1/11 11,120
Electronic voting 12/11 20,426 0:04
Electronic voting detail 22/11 408 0:15
Find receipt / fetch 18/11 250
Verification data files 18/12 139
Source code repository 12/11 55
Information Files 1/11 1505
Candidate Registration Candidate Name 6/11 379
Pronunciation (to 15/11)
Figure 9: VEC Electronic Voting web page hits: November 2014 – January 2015
6. Average time to vote BTL was 658.3 seconds—
about 11 minutes.
The proportion of formal electronic votes (i.e. bal-
lot forms that were properly completed and hence
contain votes that will be counted) was 98.13%, with
29 informal votes in District races (2.5%), and 13
informal votes in Region races (1.15%). The main
informality was people picking one only candidate in
the District race. Electors receive visual/audio/in-
language warnings as well as instructions to complete
the ballots but formal voting is not enforced by the
system. For the votes taken on paper the formal-
ity rate was 95.7%. In 2010 the electronic formality
rate was 99%, and for paper votes it was about 95%.
These statistics support the claim that the electronic
interface reduces the number of electors who acciden-
tally spoil their ballot.
6 Discussion and Lessons
learned
There was an inevitable tension between the desire to
allow voters to “vote and go” (i.e. to keep the voting
experience as lightweight as possible) and the need
to have security steps that some of the voters follow,
to ensure verifiability. The voter surveys found that
the voters were generally satisfied with their voting
experience, so the security elements did not obstruct
the voting process for them, and those that wanted
to vote and go were able to do so. Electors did not
resist the verifiability features as was observed in a
verifiable voting mock election study [17].
A key concern of the vVote project was that the
verification system might cause electors to become
confused about whether their vote was taken as it
was cast. It was estimated that the Preˆt a` Voter vot-
ing receipt randomisation of preferences would cause
electors who checked them to think their actual vote
had been changed. For this reason, all surveys in-
cluded questions about this risk. The results show
there were some isolated cases of confusion: four elec-
tors in London and two at Victorian sites reporting
explaining this at least once; and there was one let-
ter directly to VEC. In all of these cases the issues
were resolved satisfactorily. It is not the case that
electors reported, or staff observed, electors substan-
tially confused about verification receipts.
The system is a verifiable system and its verifiabil-
ity audits were well used in 2014. However, one audit
mechanism (ballot audit: voters being able to chal-
lenge and confirm a candidate list) was not promoted
for this initial deployment since there was concern it
might confuse voters unfamiliar with the concept of
verifiability. More work is needed for future deploy-
ments to make Ballot Audit simple and accessible to
both staff and electors so that is it provided in accor-
dance with the system protocol.
The system architecture was entirely housed at
VEC rather than distributed across different loca-
tions to increase resilience. vVote servers should not
be housed together, for both disaster recovery rea-
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sons and also for the Electoral Commission’s plausi-
ble deniability in keeping hands off systems that can
otherwise collude or be observed by the Commission.
Although the system was developed for use in the
State of Victoria, much of it can be customised to
elections elsewhere. The system essentially captures
and posts votes in a verifiable way, and then the
posted votes can be tallied separately. This means
that the system is not tied to a particular voting
scheme, or voting process, and can be customised to
handle different schemes involving for example sin-
gle choice, multiple choice, preference voting, or al-
ternative vote. The system is open source and it is
hoped the findings here and techniques present in the
sources lead to greater use of this approach to elec-
tronic voting.
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How many minutes did it take you to vote 
on the electronic voting system? 1 2 3 4 5-10 10-20
too long  
don't recall   
was 
interrupted
Here are some specific questions about 
the touchscreens.   For each one say 
how much you agree or disagree with 
the statement
The instructions on the screen were easy 
to follow strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
The printed lists were easy to use strongly agree agree weakly agree neither agree nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
The system was easy to use strongly agree agree weakly agree neither agree nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I would tell other people to use this 
system strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I prefer this to paper voting strongly agree agree weakly agree neither agree nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I am concerned about e-voting security strongly agree agree weakly agree neither agree nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I compared the candidate list against the 
preferences receipt in the polling place strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I am confident the system captured my 
votes correctly strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I would prefer to vote on the internet from 
home strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I understand the printed receipt and how 
it allows me to verify my vote strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
Someone who sees your receipt can 
know your vote. strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
I have trust in the electronic voting system strongly agree agree weakly agree neither agree nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
How likely is it that you will verify whether 
your vote is included in the electronic 
ballot box?
very likely likely don’t know unlikely definitely not
Being able to verify with the receipt 
whether your vote is included in the 
electronic ballot box enables you to:
ensure that privacy is ensured yes/no
ensure that the printer did not malfunciton yes/no
ensure that the printer was not 
manipulated yes/no
ensure that you are informed when I cast 
an invalid vote yes/no
ensure that my vote is properly included 
in the electronic ballot box yes/no
ensure that my vote is properly tallied yes/no
detect when poll workers in the polling 
station try to cheat yes/no
Someone who has access to your receipt 
can violate your vote privacy strongly agree agree weakly agree
neither agree 
nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
Do you have any comments about the 
system, its security and/or usability?
(free form 
comments)
As answering these questions may have 
influenced your decision about how much 
trust you have in the applied voting 
system, we would like to repeat the 
following question: to what extent do you 
agree that you have trust in the electronic 
voting system?   
strongly agree agree weakly agree neither agree nor disagree weakly disagree disagree
strongly 
disagree
Figure 10: London Survey Instrument
12
